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I. Introduction:  
On January 7, 2015, the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (“PRENDA”) was introduced in 
the Senate.1  The purpose of the proposed bill was to prohibit abortions based on the sex of the 
fetus.2  The proposed Act would have imposed criminal penalties on anyone who knowingly or 
knowingly attempts to:  
(1) Perform an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought based on the 
sex or gender of the child, 
(2) Use force or the threat of force to intentionally injure or intimidate any 
person for the purpose of coercing a sex-selection abortion, 
(3) Solicit or accept funds for the performance of such an abortion, or 
(4) Transport a woman into the United States or across a state line for the 
purpose of obtaining such an abortion.3 
 
Similar bills have been proposed many times in recent years.4  For example, in 2012, the 
United States House of Representatives considered the “Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 
2012.”  The Act would have prohibited sex discrimination against an unborn child by proscribing 
the killing of the fetus based on his or her sex.  A bipartisan majority of the House (246-168) 
voted in favor of PRENDA, but a two-thirds vote was necessary for passage.5  The 2015 
proposed bill defined "sex-selection abortion" as an abortion undertaken to eliminate a fetus 
based on the sex or gender of the child.  It excluded from the definition of "abortion" actions 
taken to terminate a pregnancy if the intent is to save the life or preserve the health of the unborn 
child, remove a dead unborn child caused by spontaneous abortion, or remove an ectopic 
                                                        
1 Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2015, S. 48, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE ON ABORTIONS FOR SEX-SELECTION AND GENETIC ABNORMALITIES: MODEL 
LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE (2015), available at http://www.aul.org/downloads/2015-Legislative-
Guides/Abortion/Prenatal_Nondiscrimination_Act__-_2015_LG.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).  
5 Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2012). See also Prenatal 
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, S. 138, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
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pregnancy.6  The proposed bill was accompanied by legislative findings asserting that a majority 
of the American public, as well as the American medical community, support a prohibition on 
sex-selection abortions.7   
Additionally, in 2007, the United States delegation led a resolution calling on countries to 
condemn sex-selection abortion at the Annual Meeting of the Commission of the Status of 
Women, 51st Session, yet sex-selection abortions were not expressly prohibited by the United 
States law or the laws of 47 states.8  During this session, the United Nations Commission on the 
Status of Women urged governments of all nations “to take necessary measures to prevent… 
prenatal sex selection.”9  Furthermore, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(“ASRM”) expressed concerns about the potential for “inherent gender discrimination,” the “risk 
of psychological harm to sex-selected offspring,” and the “reinforcement of gender bias in 
society as a whole” that is associated with sex-selection abortion.10  The American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the American Association of Pro-Life 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“AAPLOG”) also argued that sex-selection abortion poses 
dangers to American society, including sexist practices, danger to the health of pregnant mothers, 
and the risk of “dehumanization” and “new eugenics.”11   
This Note argues that, despite the positions of these professional associations, laws 
prohibiting sex-selection abortion prohibition should not be enacted for two reasons: (1) the 
prohibition places an undue burden on women seeking an abortion and (2) Congress has no 
                                                        
6 Id. 
7 Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2015, S. 48 § 7, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) (stating 
that, according to a March 2006 Zogby International poll, 86% of Americans believe that sex-selection 
abortion should be illegal).  
8 S. 48 § 6, 8.  
9 Id. 
10 S. 48 § 11.  
11 Id.  
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constitutional authority to enact a law like this.12 Part II of this Note discusses the background 
and origin of the increasing concern about sex-selection abortions in the United States, and the 
influence of other countries on American legislation. Part III explains the existing framework of 
abortion law in the United States, and demonstrates that a ban on sex-selection abortion cannot 
be reconciled with longstanding precedent, specifically the “undue burden” test.  Part IV 
examines whether the Constitution empowers Congress to create a federal sex-based abortion 
ban under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Part V discusses the moral 
and ethical claims that drive the argument in favor of a ban on sex-selection abortion. Part VI 
proposes alternatives to a federal ban on sex-selection abortion. Part VII concludes that the 
policy concerns related to the practice of sex-selection abortions do not justify enacting an 
unconstitutional law. 
II. Background/History:  
A. States that Have Adopted Sex-Selection Bans  
Only six states ban abortions based on the sex of the child: Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.13  Illinois became the first state 
to adopt such a law in 1975.14  The law states "no person shall intentionally perform an abortion 
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of 
the fetus."15  The law includes an exception for abortions related to genetic disorders.  Later in 
1989, Pennsylvania enacted The Abortion Control Act, which states that physicians may only 
perform abortions that are “necessary” and “no abortion which is sought because of the sex of 
                                                        
12 Justin Gillette, Pregnant and Prejudices: The Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion 
Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 645, 648-49 (2013).  
13 AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4.  
14 Id. at 650.  
15 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/6(8) (2012). 
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the unborn child shall be deemed a necessary abortion.”16  In 2011, Arizona enacted the Susan B. 
Anthony and Fredrick Douglass Prenatal Discrimination Act, which imposed criminal penalties 
on those who “perform an abortion knowing that the abortion sought is based on the sex or race 
of the child or the race of a parent of that child."17  Most recently, North Dakota became the first 
state to sign into law a ban on sex-selection abortions using the AUL Model legislation.18  This 
law considers the following a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may not 
intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge 
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely: (a) on account of 
the sex of the unborn child; or (b) because the unborn child has been 
diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic 
abnormality.  
 
The anti-choice group American United for Life (“AUL”) supported the North Dakota 
bill, creating model language for states and the federal government to use in legislation.19   
B. Origin of Sex-Selective Abortions 
Sex-selection abortions are most common in China, India, and South Korea, where there 
is a strong desire in families for the birth of boys.20  These countries use sex-selection as a tool 
for gender discrimination because they highly promote patriarchal values.21  In India, for 
                                                        
16 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3204(c) (West 2012). 
17 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (2013). 
18 N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-02.1-04.1 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); North Dakota Becomes First 
State to limit Abortions Based on Sex-Selection and Genetic Abnormalities Using AUL Model Legislation, 
AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.aul.org/2013/03/north-dakota-becomes-first-state-to-
limit-abortions- 
based-on-sex-selection-and-genetic-abnormalities-using-aul-model-legislation/ (hereinafter North Dakota 
Becomes First) 
19 Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?: Examining the 
Potential for Disability Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 
MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 291, 303 (2013). AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, supra note 4.  The remaining states 
follow similar language in enacting laws that ban sex-selection abortions.  
20 Kirssa Webb, Note. Gender Mis-Conception The Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act as a Remix of the 
Abortion Debate, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 258-259 (2013).   
21 Id. at 257.   
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example, the birth of a son is associated with social, political, and economic entitlement.22  
Coincidentally, India is also cited as having the starkest disparity between the birth ratio of boys 
versus girls.23  While the normal at-birth ratio for boys to girls is 1000 to 952, the birth ratio in 
India is 1000 to 943.24  Furthermore, South Korean statistic reflects a 1.52 son ratio for every 1 
daughter in cases of second pregnancies.25  Certain scholars assume that this disparity in birth 
ratio is a result of sex selection procedures.26  While male preference was largely established 
through infanticide in previous eras, new prenatal technology has made it easier to abort a child 
before she is even born.27  The concern resulting from the change in birth rate lends itself onto 
the  ongoing conversation among anti-abortion legislators and groups in the United States.28  
Many of the proposed bills advocating for a ban on sex-selection abortion contain extensive 
references to sex-selection in countries such as India.29   
Furthermore, recent surveys, individual interviews, and focus groups have indicated that 
sex preference also exists in America, especially among the Asian American community.30  
Although a simple preference does not necessarily lead to specifically targeting the abortions of 
female fetuses, it is true that advances in reproductive technology have made it possible to 
identify the sex of a fetus at earlier stages of pregnancy.31  Preference of a certain sex has also 
                                                        
22 Id. at 258 
23 Sital Kalantry, Sex Selection in the United States and India: A Contextualist Feminist Approach, 18 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 61, 62 (2013).  
24 Id. at 62-63.  
25 Webb, supra note 20 at 259.  
26 Kalantry, supra note 23 at 63.  
27 Webb, supra note 20 at 259. 
28 Kalantry, supra note 23 at 63. 
29 Id at 64. 
30 Sujatha Jesudason and Anat Shenker-Osorio, Sex Selection in America: Why It Persists and How We 
Can Change It, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2012) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/sex-
selection-in-america-why-it-persists-and-how-we-can-change-it/257864/. 
31 Gillette, supra note 12 at 647.  
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contributed to seven states passing sex-selection bans.32  For example, the Gallup poll, taken in 
2011, found that forty-nine percent of Americans preferred the birth of a boy as compared to 
twenty-two percent who found the birth of a girl preferable.33  
 In lawmaking, the seven  states took into account the attitudes and practices of Chinese 
and Indians as evidence for passing the ban.34  The difficulty in using these statistics lies within 
drawing a line between when it is acceptable to intervene in the woman’s decision-making 
autonomy on abortion and “applying the notions of ‘choice’ to germinate restrictive notions of 
gender.”35  While it is important to take into consideration statistics from other countries, it is 
equally critical to note that the implications of limitations on abortions in America differ vastly 
than those of other countries.  For one, there is a key difference in legal frameworks between 
other countries and the United States as illustrated by principle cases such as Roe v. Wade and 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.36  Additionally, there is no evidence demonstrating that 
individuals, in fact, do act upon their desire to predetermine the sex of their child.37  Therefore, it 
is best to analyze any existing sex-selection problem in America through the accurate 
constitutional lens.  
C. Sex-Selection in the United States  
Although gender preference is a proven problem in other countries, in order to determine the 
constitutionality of PRENDA, it is important to determine whether sex-selection is a reason 
                                                        
32 Kalantry, supra note 23 at 63-64. 
33 Id. Frank Newport, Americans Prefer Boys to Girls, Just as They Did in 1941, GALLUP, (June 23, 2011) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/148187/americans-prefer-boys-girls-1941.aspx.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Naryung Kim, Breaking Free from Patriarchy: A Comparative Study of Sex Selection Abortion In 
Korea and the United States, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 301, 308 (2000). 
37 Id.  
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women seek an abortion in the United States.  In a 2014 empirical study conducted by Cornell 
University Law School, researchers attempted to uncover the myths behind sex-selective 
abortion laws in the United States.38  One of the myths unraveled in this study states that “male-
biased sex ratios at birth are proof that sex-selection abortions are occurring.”39  The study 
explains that these ratios are misleading in light of newer technology such as “sperm sorting,” 
that allow the fertilization of an egg with a desired sex even before insemination.40  Therefore, 
the proponents of sex-selection bans are quick to jump to the conclusion that any disparity in sex 
ratios are solely due to abortions.41 In light of such studies, both quantitative and qualitative 
studies have presented controversial conclusions as to sex-selection abortions.42  In some studies, 
the ethnic communities studied constituted a very small proportion of the wider American 
population.43  Additionally, the disparate ratios in the studies were not clearly explained.44  
Therefore, “neither opponents nor proponents of sex-selective abortion bans strengthen their case 
by arguing that there is no desire to select for sex or that sex selection is a rampant problem in 
the [United States].”45  
III. The Constitutional Right to Abortion  
A. Existing Abortion Framework in the United States 
                                                        
38 Brian Citro et al., Replacing Myths with Facts: Sec-Selective Abortion Laws in the United States, 
CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS (June 2014) http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1399.  
39 Id. at 6.  
40 Id. at 7.  The process known as sperm sorting allows sex selection achieved by a technique known as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  Medical professionals remove eggs from a woman and fertilize 
them outside of the body using a procedure called in-vitro fertilization (IVF).  Only the embryos of the 
desired sex are implanted in the uterus.  
41 Id.  
42 Rachel Rebouche, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH, L. REV. 519, 531-33 (2015). 
43 Id. at 533.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 534.  
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 Many countries have addressed sex-selection abortions with prohibitions, but it is harder 
for the United States to do so, given that its legal precedent gives preference to individual 
autonomy and personal preference over “societal effects, limiting the birth rate, and the status of 
women.”46  The United States Supreme Court has laid out the basis of the abortion framework. 
Before viability, the state cannot pass measures that pose an “undue burden” on the woman’s 
ability to obtain an abortion.47  Because the United States legal framework on abortion is already 
developed, proponents of the sex-selection abortion ban would have to carve out a prohibition 
within the existing framework.48  
While States cannot directly interfere with a woman’s decision-making before the fetus is 
viable, the Supreme Court has left power amongst the states to place certain restrictions on when 
an abortion can be performed; what kind of medical procedures can be used; and what 
information the State can require doctors to provide pregnant women who are seeking an 
abortion.  An attempt to enact federal legislation such as PRENDA will begin a complex 
constitutional discussion about whether banning sex-selection abortions will infringe on liberty 
and privacy interests.49    
i. Roe v. Wade 
In Roe v. Wade, the Court found that the right of privacy within the Fourteenth 
Amendment encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.50  While recognizing 
                                                        
46 Webb, supra note 20 at 263.  
47 Casey, 505 U.S at 877-78. 
48 Webb, supra note 20 at 263. 
49 Webb, supra note 20 at 264.  
50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). “…No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws…”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
IX.  
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the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, the Court also recognized the State’s right to 
safeguard the health of both woman and child.51  Therefore, the privacy right of a woman in 
terminating a pregnancy is not absolute.52  However, because a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy falls within the right of privacy, which is a “fundamental right,” any restrictions on 
that right must be justified by a “compelling state interest.”53  
The Court concluded that the balance between the woman’s right and the state’s interest 
changes over the course of the pregnancy.54  In the first trimester, the woman’s interest is 
paramount, and “the decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the 
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”55  The government may not prohibit abortions and may 
regulate them only as it regulates other medical procedures.56  In the second trimester, “the State, 
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”57 Finally, in the third trimester, 
“the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may if it chooses, regulate, 
and even prescribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”58  
ii. Planned Parenthood v. Casey  
Although Casey reaffirmed that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to choose 
to terminate a pregnancy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,59 the 
                                                        
51 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 154-55.   
54 Id. at 162-163. 
55 Id. at 164. 
56 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Casey, 505 U.S 845.  
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Court rejected the trimester framework previously set forth in Roe.  In its place, it adopted a new 
analytical framework under which the state may not place “undue burdens” on a woman’s right 
to choose to terminate a pregnancy pre-viability.60  An “undue burden,” as defined by the Court 
in Casey, means the placement of a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.61  The Court explained that this standard does not preclude states 
from attempting to persuade women to choose childbirth over an abortion.62   
In this case specifically, the Court decided that the following restrictions under 
the Pennsylvania law did not unduly burden a woman seeking an abortion: (1) informed 
consent/24-hour waiting period; (2) parental consent; (3) additional record keeping; and 
(4) narrow medial emergency exception .63  The Court concluded, however, that spousal 
consent was unduly burdensome for a woman seeking an abortion.64   
After the holding of Casey, a new issue was presented questioning when an 
obstacle was a “substantial” obstacle.65  The Court distinguished between a costly 
abortion, which was not considered to be an obstacle, from a statute that prevented a 
“large fraction” of women from exercising their right to abortion, which was considered 
to be a substantial obstacle.66  While the Court left lower courts to analyze what is 
substantial and what is not, no determinative framework had been established.67  The 
Court did, however, decide that a statute substantially hindered women’s free choice if it 
                                                        
60 Id. at 872-73.  
61 Id. at 877. 
62 Id. at 878.  
63 Casey, 505 U.S at 879-87.   
64 Id. at 887-99.   
65 Kali Ann Trahanas, How the Undue Burden Standard is Eroding Informed Consent, 10 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 231, 247 (2013). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 248.  
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consisted of unnecessary health regulations and if it interfered with a woman’s ability to 
make a free choice pre-viability.68  Despite the attempt at specificity, these two examples 
still left lower courts with many inferences to make regarding what statutes are 
unconstitutional under the Casey framework.   
Subsequent state and federal statutes have been tested under the undue burden standard to 
discern the parameters of permissive regulation. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the court struck down a 
Nebraska law banning “dilation and extraction” (D&E) abortions because it was unduly 
burdensome on the woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.69  The Court reasoned 
that because the method of D&E was the most common form of abortion method for performing 
pre-viability, second trimester abortions, restricting its use on pregnant women would be unduly 
burdensome.70  The Court differentiated the Nebraska law from similar laws in Kansas, Utah, 
and Montana, which were tailored to proscribing the use of a specific type of D&E procedure.  
By limiting the restriction to just one type of method, these states, the Court reasoned, were not 
placing an undue burden on the woman seeking an abortion, particularly because other methods 
of abortion were available.71  The concurring opinion in Stenberg went on to describe a statute 
that it would have held constitutional under the undue burden test: one that places a ban on 
partial-birth abortion that only proscribes one method of abortion and included an exception to 
“preserve the life and health of the mother.”72  
The Court’s example in Stenberg came to life in 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S. 
124 (2007)., where a similar law on partial-birth abortion was upheld because "[r]egulations 
                                                        
68 Id. at 249. 
69 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948 (2000).  
70 Id. at 949.  
71 Id. at 950. 
72 Id. at 951.  
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which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to 
the woman's exercise of the right to choose."73  This Act was distinguishable from the law in 
Stenberg because it described the procedure specifically so that doctors would not be prosecuted 
for performing D&E, which is legal.74  Additionally, the law specified a specific form of D&E 
that was prohibited, rather than and entire range of D&E procedures, and it included an 
exception for the health of the mother.75  Currently, the legal framework on abortion in America 
is characterized by balancing the competing interest of a woman's reproductive autonomy and 
the State interest in fetal life and in the woman's health.76   
B. The Application of the Undue Burden Standard to Prohibitions on Sex-
Selection Abortions 
Generally, restrictions on abortion require a showing that the regulations do not impinge 
on the two recognized bases for a woman's right: (1) the health of the mother and (2) her right to 
choose whether or not to have a child within a limited window of her pregnancy.77  On the other 
hand, the state also reserves the right to protect interest in potential life.78   Traditionally the 
framework for abortion regulation has been seen as a compromise between women’s 
reproductive rights and the state’s interest in protecting potential life.79  In order to assess 
prohibitions on sex-selection abortion under the Casey framework, however, Courts must ask 
whether the nature of a woman’s right is unduly burdened by the regulation at hand.80  
                                                        
73 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).  
74 Id. at 141. 
75 Id.  
76 Gillette, supra note 12 at 664.  
77 Webb, supra note 20 at 269.  
78 Id. at 273.  
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
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Proponents of a ban on sex-selection abortions argue that a prohibition would protect 
rather than limit, a women’s rights of health and choice.  They argue that women bear the social 
burden of producing sons and are often punished if they do not.81  Furthermore, proponents of 
the ban argue the coercion and perhaps violence that stems from deciding to forego a sex-
selective abortion negates a woman’s right of health.82 Additional consequences of such an 
abortion on women’s health include psychological harm and emotional trauma.83  Similarly, 
because of coercion to abort, a woman’s interest in choice might also be at risk.  “Sex-selective 
abortion regulation thus acknowledges that sex-selective abortion threatens the right of the 
mother by depriving her of her right [to] govern her body and parenting choice.”84  
In contrast, opponents of legislation to ban sex-selection abortion argue that such laws are 
a “novel” and “aggressive” intrusion on a women’s right to choose.85  They note that while male 
preference might be prevalent in countries such as China and India, there is less intense sexism 
and discrimination in the United States.86  In response to the burden of bearing sons, opponents 
of the sex-selection ban argue that the power to decide will give woman the option to refuse 
giving birth to sons and even avoid motherhood altogether.87  Moreover, proponents of sex 
selection point to the advantage of avoiding sex-linked diseases by allowing women to abort 
children with such infirmities.88  
                                                        
81 Jodi Danis, Recent Development: Sexism and “The Superfluous Female”: Argument for Regulating 
Pre-Implantation Sex Selection, 18 Harv. Women’s L.J. 219, 224 (1995). 
82 Webb, supra note 20 at 269.   
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 271.  
85 Donley, supra note 19 at 323.   
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In light of the Court’s analysis in Casey and subsequent decisions, the opponents appear 
to have the stronger arguments. One of the major flaws with PRENDA is that it subjects women 
who are seeking an abortion to intense scrutiny, thus reversing the established framework under 
Casey.89   
First, it inadvertently places certain classes of women at a higher level of scrutiny 
because of the preconceived notion that many of these women come to the United States to seek 
a “safe haven” away from the restrictive abortion legislation in their countries.90  Specifically, a 
federal ban risks subjecting Asian women to strict scrutiny by their doctors when seeking an 
abortion, solely because these groups of women are the ones who typically come to America for 
sex-selection abortions91.  Some might argue that a sex-selection abortion ban places a burden 
upon less than one percent of the women seeking abortions.92  This argument, however, does not 
save the ban from facial invalidity, for an analysis of facial invalidity looks to the women who 
might seek a reason-based abortion, not women who are seeking an abortion as a whole.93   
Secondly, the “reporting requirement” under PRENDA would be ineffective, for there is 
no actual way of finding out a woman’s true motivation behind an abortion.94  PRENDA mimics 
the language of existing statutes in Illinois and Pennsylvania, which ban any abortions sought 
“solely” on account of the sex of the fetus.95  Such language assumes that women have a single 
reason for an abortion that can be easily determined.96  “Finding out the reason for abortion and 
                                                        
89 Eugene Park, Note: Hopping for Gender: The Unlawfulness of an Unregulated Market for Parental 
Gender Selection and Selective Gender Abortion, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 521, 546 (2014).  
90 Id. at 531.  
91 Id. at 546. 
92 Id.  
93 Donley, supra note 19 at 324. 
94 Park, supra note 89 at 546.  
95 Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s 
Gender, 6 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 1, 44 (1992). 
96 Id.   
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weeding out those aborting due to gender issues would be next to impossible.”97  The legal effect 
of PRENDA becomes minimal when courts attempt to measure the subjective motives of a 
pregnant woman.98  If a woman is physically coerced to undergo the abortion, it is unlikely that 
she will bring a suit against her doctor or coercer because of the added pressure.99  Additionally, 
in cases where the woman in socially or psychologically coerced to undergo a sex-selective 
abortion, it again seems unlikely that she will later take action towards the doctor or the coercer.  
Because the motivation of an abortion is indiscernible, a federal ban would be far-
reaching in nature.  Using the North Dakota ban, for example, a sex-selection abortion goes 
beyond an attempt to persuade a women against abortion; rather it prohibits the abortion 
altogether.100  This is distinguishable from Gonzales, in which a specific procedure was banned 
rather than a sweeping abortion ban.101  In fact, the Court in Gonzales made it clear that the ban 
it was placing was dependent on the D&E procedure remaining available to women.102  
Therefore, the Court’s ruling should be read as to only prevent any true pre-viability abortion 
ban.103  The North Dakota abortion ban, however, exceeds the ruling in Gonzales by outlawing 
certain pre-viability abortions, contradicting the ruling in Casey.104    
Furthermore, the criminal sanctions imposed by the government upon violators of 
PRENDA make it problematic for medical professionals to perform any abortions on women.105  
The proposed law prohibits any abortion that practitioners had “knowledge” of being motivated 
                                                        
97 Id. at 547.  
98 Webb, supra note 20 at 274.  
99 Id. 
100 Donley, supra note 19 at 323.  
101Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 150-55.  
102 Id. 
103 Donley, supra note 19 at 324. 
104 Id.   
105 Id. 
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by sex-selection.106  Determining whether a medical professional had such knowledge is just as 
impossible as determining a woman’s motivation for the abortion, if not more.107  Hence, the fear 
of lawsuits can consequentially infringe on a woman’s right to access an abortion generally 
because doctors and medical professionals will be reluctant to perform abortions.108  The breach 
in the relationship between provider and patient is also of concern if a ban is placed upon sex-
selective abortion.109  While women might initially rely on a doctor’s expertise and advice on the 
abortion they seek, such disclosures might be withheld in fear of criminal sanctions.110  
Predicting the most negative outcome, it might even be possible that women would result into 
seeking illegal abortions.111  Banning sex-selective abortions can endanger both the life of the 
women and the child, risking the abuse and neglect of both.112   
Additionally, in Casey, the Court did not discuss how the undue burden status would 
apply in the event of “inconclusive or disputed medical authority, or where states exaggerate the 
creditability of ill-supported studies and information.”113  PRENDA is based upon statistics from 
foreign countries, such as China and India, and it is difficult to determine with the statistics at 
hand whether or not sex-selection abortions pose a large enough problem in the United States.  
Nevertheless, there are reported incidents where physicians express concerns when their patients 
ask for an abortion based on gender preference.114  Once again, the lack of guidance by the 
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Casey framework makes it hard to pick which one of these factors weigh heavier than the other 
in analyzing the constitutionality of a PRENDA: simple statistics or factual accounts. As argued 
commonly in abortion legislation, “the existence of some trivial reasons should not deter … from 
the larger goal of protecting the right of women to make such decisions in the first place 
[emphasis added] ….”  With these contrasting outlooks, there is no predicting whether a larger 
disparity in birth ratios would deem the ban unconstitutional.  Ultimately, it is best to apply a 
totality of circumstances test, under which it becomes apparent that the chances of PRENDA 
surviving under a constitutional shield is slim.  
IV. Congressional Authority 
A. Congress’s Power under the Commerce Clause 
Even if sex-selection bans pass the undue burden standard, it is not clear whether 
Congress has the power to pass such legislation.  The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce.115  Congress may regulate three broad categories under the 
Commerce Clause: the use of channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce.116  Abortion does not fit into the first two categories, so the only 
way Congress would have the power to pass a sex-selection abortion ban is by showing that there 
is a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.117   
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 The Court in United States v. Lopez held that the link between national productivity and 
possession of firearm was too attenuated.118 The Act under question in this case was the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, which made it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess 
firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone.119  The 
Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly 
possess firearm in a school zone exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.120 In 
Lopez, the court developed a four-point analysis to determine whether there was a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.  First, the court observed that this Act was a criminal 
statute that had nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic activity.121 Second, the 
court found that the Act contained no express jurisdictional hook, such as a limitation to a 
discrete set of firearm possessions that have an explicit connection with interstate commerce.122  
Third, the Court observed that the legislative history behind the Act contained no congressional 
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in school zones.123  
Finally, the decision in Lopez concluded that the connection between gun possession and 
interstate commerce was too attenuated.124  Ultimately, the court rejected the Act because it 
feared that anything could fall under Congressional power in the name of economic productivity, 
including matters of family law such as marriage, divorce, and child custody.125 
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Similar to Lopez, a sex-selection abortion ban would not pass the test of “substantial 
economic activity.”126   A ban on sex-selection abortion is not economic in nature; rather, 
opponents of the ban argue that it is a way to regulate government moral disapproval of such 
action hidden under the pretense of sex discrimination prevention.127  Traditionally, when 
medical practice has been a matter of state police powers, the allocation of power to the federal 
government is viewed as an infringement to the state’s right to regulate.128  For example, in 
2006, the Supreme Court held that the federal Controlled Substance Act could not be used to 
prosecute physicians who assist in suicide in states where suicide is already legal.129  The 
reasoning behind this holding was that where states already had a reasonable position, there was 
no need for the federal government to invalidate merely because of opposing views.130  A federal 
sex-selection ban would be equality problematic because the regulation of abortion correlates 
with “vastly different, and regionally correlated, public opinions.”131  Therefore, states are in the 
best position to create laws banning sex-selection abortions.132   
Additionally, the connection between sex-selection abortion and interstate commerce is 
highly attenuated.133  For example, the report issued by the Committee on the Judiciary points to 
the fact that some women travel out of state to obtain an abortion; however, there is no data 
provided as to whether the purpose of these travels is specifically to obtain sex-selection 
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abortions.134  The data, however, in this circumstance is skewed.135 It must be noted that the 
economic impact is based on abortions as a whole.136  Sex-selective abortions only make up a 
small portion of overall abortions.  Hence, the numbers provided by the Committee is 
misleading.137   
Lastly, even if the sex-selection abortion ban contained a jurisdictional hook, it would 
still fail three of the four elements presented under Lopez.138  First, under PRENDA, Congress 
would not be regulating economic activity, but rather using moral arguments to impose stronger 
restrictions on the medical profession in performing abortions.139  Second, legislative history that 
attempts to demonstrate a link between sex-selection abortion and interstate commerce is 
arguably “mere pretext,” motivated by the desire to simply pass the legislation based on moral 
judgment.140  Third, the highly attenuated link between sex-selection abortion and interstate 
commerce leads to the question whether PRENDA was intended for an economic purpose at all, 
or rather was it simply put into place to regulate abortion.141  Ultimately, the decision to enact 
bans sex-selection abortion falls in the hands of the individual states.  
B. Congress’s Power under the Necessary and Proper Clause  
Federalism-based concerns were further addressed in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, in which the Court assessed the constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
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Act.142  After finding that the law did not pass muster under the Commerce Clause, the Court 
also concluded that the law could not be justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause.143  This is 
premised around the fact that if “upholding the law based on the Commerce Clause implicates 
principles of federalism, so would upholding the law based on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.144  An attempt to convince otherwise will be met with suspicion by the Court of the 
government’s attempt to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause simply to overlook any federal 
intrusion into the states’ police power.145  Given that a sex-selection abortion ban does not pass 
under the Commerce Clause, it is reasonable to assume that it similarly implicates federalism 
concerns under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it attempts to regulate legislative health 
and safety issues traditionally reserved for the states.146  
V. Moral and Ethical Implications 
Although sex-selection abortion bans are not likely to overcome a constitutional bar, there 
are still deep-seated ethical and moral implications of the procedure.  Son-preference was a 
problem before the development of sex selection technology.  Because of the availability of 
modern technology, people are now allowed to subtly act on this preference and manifest 
entrenched gender discrimination and inequity that result from sex-selection abortions.147  Two 
principal concerns arise from sex selection.  First, sex selection technology “distorts the nature 
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sex ratio leading to a gender imbalance.” Second, “it reinforces discriminatory and sexist 
stereotypes towards women by devaluing females.”148  There is a strong a possibility that a few 
people desire sex-selection abortion for gender-discrimination purposes.  However, the issue 
becomes whether the gender-discrimination motive for abortion by a few is enough to lead to a 
widespread rejection of sex-selection for non-medical reasons.149  Quite apparently, there is no 
further analysis yet available on the matter to address the issue, but PRENDA does bring to light 
new discussions with regard to sex-selection abortion  
VI. Alternatives 
Knowing that the passage of a federal sex-selection ban is difficult under constitutional 
restraints, the better alternative would be to direct attention towards the growing prenatal gender 
selection industry.150  Abortion is not the only way sex selection can be achieved; reproductive 
technologies are a growing market without much regulation.151  Motives behind a woman’s 
choice to have an abortion are difficult to determine, but it is easier to detect the use of prenatal 
gender selection technology for non-necessary, non-life threatening reasons.152  Therefore, there 
is a better chance of monitoring the use of such technology through federal and state agencies to 
minimize harm to the consumer.153   
In addition, the medical community can engage in self-regulation where individual 
doctors may refuse to use sex selection technology for non-medical reasons.154  Of course, there 
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are many obstacles to such regulation, such as some doctors taking advantage of the lucrative 
market of sex-selection technology and the risk of doctors making certain decisions for the 
woman.155  These effects might be avoided if professional medical associations and licensing 
bodies were to place stringent regulations monitoring the use of sex selection technology.156  For 
example, penalties on professional licenses must be placed by the medical community.157  
Although self-regulation by doctors seems like the ideal solution to deter sex-selection abortions, 
the use of sex selection technology is a growing market, that scientists and doctors do not wish to 
overlook.   
Much of the advocacy of the sex-selection abortion ban revolves around information and 
statistics from abroad, often manipulated to garner support for the ban in the United States.  If 
proponents of the ban hope to pass legislation, the next step is  to show the effects of sex-
selection abortion on individuals residing in the United States.158  Furthermore, instead of 
reaching the conclusion of a ban, opponents of sex-selection abortions should first target public 
awareness and education campaigns since much of the practice is taboo and goes 
unmentioned.159  
VII. Conclusion  
The future of a federal sex-selection ban is a difficult one to justify. The sex-selection 
abortion bans that have been enacted or proposed have been uniform.160  Any federal sex-
selective abortion ban will be invalidated based on an inappropriate use of enumerated federal 
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powers and the current legal framework on abortion.161  The predicted unconstitutionality of a  
federal ban does not, however, indicate that sex-selection abortions are not a problem in the 
United States.  Nevertheless, if attention must be given to the matter, better statistics on the 
effects of sex-selection abortion on American females and fetuses must be provided.  
Furthermore, states are better capable of balancing interests by drafting their statutes to reflect 
more closely the differing standards that apply pre- and post-viability under Casey.162  For 
example, pre-viability, states can focus on prohibiting abortions based “solely” on gender 
preference.163  Post-viability, state prohibition can focus on the element of “knowledge.”  
Creating such distinctions does not guarantee that sex-selection bans will pass the constitutional 
muster, but it may maximize the effect of the ban.164   
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